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a decline in civic activism, and a breakdown of the socialsupport mechanisms that had been one of the strengths of the Soviet system.
The blame for this turn of events is placed primarily on Yeltsin and his chief political and economic advisers. Western leaders, the International Monetary Fund, and particularly Western economists are also accused of encouraging Russian leaders to follow an inhumane set of policies. The overall reform strategy, generally in line with what has come to be known as the Washington Consensus or "shock therapy," emphasized monetarist approaches, price deregulation, rapid privatization of industry, and the end of government-provided subsidies and social safety nets. One of the most important contributions of the book is its explication of the behind-the-scenes political maneuvering that produced the reform strategy. Especially useful are the insights on the various protoparties and political movements that struggled to establish a political foothold in the chaotic developments of the period. Reddaway and Glinski coin the term "market bolshevism" to describe the political mindset of the winners-the political figures such as Anatoly Chubais who implemented shock therapy-a disregard for public opinion and a manipulative approach that manufactured mass support only when absolutely necessary, as during Yeltsin's bid for reelection in 1996. This is a book that provides an overabundance of detail, and almost no evidence relevant to its main thesis is overlooked. Some of the evidence that contradicts the thesis is perhaps dismissed too readily, however. The authors view the period of shock therapy as having lasted seven years, rejecting arguments by reform defenders that the Yeltsin government quickly backtracked and that compromises made because of political weakness undermined the foundations of many of the reforms. Instead, Reddaway and Glinski present this "seesaw" approach as the intended strategy. Further, a number of phenomena-such as the rise of criminal mafias-that were presumably unanticipated consequences of the policy choices made are presented as if they were part and parcel of the reformers' strategy.
The authors present alternative paths as real options, although they seem beyond what was possible in Russia at the end of the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s. Popular discontenta "grassroots anti-nomenklatura upsurge" (p. 253)-that supposedly could have been mobilized into a movement in support of another kind of reform did not appear to have the kind of usable potential that the authors suggest. In order to tap this presumed source of support, the authors argue that Yeltsin should have relied more on the nascent democratic movement. In particular, they favor the nationaldemocratic wing, such political figures as Sergei Baburin and Oleg Rumiantsev. In the early 1990s, these figures were marginalized politically, and they joined the opposition that conspired to seize power in October 1993. Reddaway and Glinski also side with opposition economists such as Sergei Glaziev, who has long advocated an economic strategy based on government support of key industries and strong social programs for the victims of reforms.
There is an unfortunate tendency in some of the analysis to relay as evidence conjecture and conspiracy theories that figure so prominently in the Russian media. For example, the shortages of consumer goods in the late Soviet period are viewed not as evidence of the collapse of the previous system but as a pressure tactic by wholesale traders to wrest control from the state over this sector. In discussing the events of October 1993, when the anti-Yeltsin opposition in parliament launched a violent attempt to seize the mayor's office, television facilities, and other centers of power, the authors use speculative and dubious accounts to suggest that the violence was deliberately facilitated by Yeltsin's security forces. The goal was to justify the later use of tanks against the parliament in support of Yeltsin's ultimate purpose, "the destruction of Russia's parliamentarism for the sake of increasing his personal power" (p. 429). The authors find it plausible that the 1999 incursion by Chechen rebels in Dagestan was provoked by the Russian security forces (headed at the time by Vladimir Putin) in order to provide an excuse to start a new war in Chechnya.
Overall, though, despite its weaknesses and occasional lapses, Reddaway and Glinski's account provides an extraordinary wealth of information on the twists and turns of Russian politics during this formative period. The Politics of the Belly, 1993), the politics of the belly is the phenomenon of "eating" the fruits of power. The extent to which officeholders monopolize or share these fruits with the larger community has, however, significant consequences for their legitimacy. As Michael Schatzberg suggests, a "moral matrix of legitimate governance" (p. 35) embedded in familial and paternal metaphors shapes these belly politics. In turn, he argues that the moral matrix is rooted in four major premises. The first and second are related to the image of the ruler as a "fatherchief," who has the obligation, on the one hand, to nurture and nourish his "family," and on the other hand, to punish his "children" when necessary and pardon them when they truly repent. The third premise concerns the status of women in society; while they are not considered equal to men, rulers should, nonetheless, respect their role as "counselors and advisers." The fourth premise "holds that permanent power is illegitimate and that political fathers... have to let their children grow up, mature, take on ever-increasing responsibilities in the conduct of their own affairs, and eventually succeed them in power" (p. 192). Governments that respect these four moral premises are not necessarily democratic, but they enjoy legitimacy and thus will endure; neither the ballot nor the bullet is likely to overthrow them. When the "father-chief" "eats" within limits and guarantees his "family" access to food, while both knowing that his power is not eternal and listening to his "wives" and "daughters," he will win popular support. To that extent, Africans will be satisfied with a regime that responds to their own norms of accountability and legitimacy. These norms correspond to what Schatzberg calls "thinkability." Thinkability is not simply "that which is politically thinkable" but is also, in Schatzberg's eyes, legitimacy itself. Moreover, the author contends, legitimacy can be apprehended through an exhaustive study of the "mainstream political discourse" (p. 32).
Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa
Political The book does not systematically account for the mixed results from the major cases, exposing the analytical weakness of the "electoral engineering" approach. For instance, perhaps the most important insight of the book, which is found only in the last few pages (pp. 185-192), concerns the significance of two aspects of ethnic group demographics--fragmentation and concentration-in mediating the expected impact of preferential designs. With respect to fragmentation, ethnically heterogeneous districts are considered to be "the single most important demographic precondition for centripetal strategies to work effectively" (p. 185). Group concentration, on the other hand, creates ethnically homogeneous electoral districts, rendering the use of vote pooling highly problematic.
Reilly wisely uses these demographic variations to caution against a cookie-cutter approach to electoral engineering. Curiously, however, he does not systematically examine the implications of these variations in the case studies, even though ethnically heterogeneous districts are commonplace in Papua New Guinea and ethnically concentrated districts presumably exist in Northern Ireland, the two cases that provide unambiguous support for preferential systems. Also left unexamined is the failure of AV to produce the expected results in Fiji, where the ethnic group demographic (dispersion and geographic intermixing) is also considered favorable for the effectiveness of the design (p. 187). Examination of these issues requires a more rigorous analytical approach than allowed by the normative electoral engineering approach. It especially requires the use of quantitative techniques such as regression analysis to clarify the independent, additive, and interactive effects of institutional design and context on electoral outcomes. The two approaches, however, are not mutually exclusive. Quantitative analysis provides the systematic knowledge and understanding of the relative effects of institution and context that are necessary for realizing the prescriptive aspirations of the electoral engineering approach.
Reilly's book, therefore, does not close the debate on the appropriate institutional design of electoral systems for managing ethnic conflicts. But its coherent and convincing arguments in favor of preferential systems, and especially its coverage of heretofore unfamiliar and understudied cases that have employed them, advance and enrich it.
